USERRA Oxymoron: Termination as a Valid Reemployment Position, The by Hance, Breanna
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 78 
Issue 4 Fall 2013 Article 12 
Fall 2013 
USERRA Oxymoron: Termination as a Valid Reemployment 
Position, The 
Breanna Hance 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Breanna Hance, USERRA Oxymoron: Termination as a Valid Reemployment Position, The, 78 MO. L. REV. 
(2013) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
File: Hance – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on: 3/18/2014 6:23:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:49:00 PM 
NOTE 
The USERRA Oxymoron: Termination as a 
Valid Reemployment Position 
Milhauser v. Minco Products, Inc., 701 F.3d 268 (8th Cir. 2012) 
BREANNA HANCE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between 2000 and 2010, more than two million United States soldiers, 
marines, and sailors served in Iraq or Afghanistan.1  At times, nearly thirty-
five percent of U.S. forces in the Middle East consisted of National Guard 
and Reserve military forces.2  These service members – sometimes referred to 
as “citizen soldiers” – maintain normal civilian lives and employment but are 
prepared to serve their country as needed.3  Unfortunately, upon return from 
military service, many citizen soldiers suffer adverse retaliation, discrimina-
tion, or termination at the hands of their civilian employers.4  With 90,000 
troops slated to return from Afghanistan by 2014, reemployment rights for 
returning service members are an increasing concern.5 
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA) protects uniformed service members returning to civilian em-
ployment.6  For qualified service members, the act establishes a right to 
reemployment upon return from military service in the position the service 
  
 * B.A., University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2014; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2013-2014.  Spe-
cial thank you to Dean Rafael Gely and the entire Law Review staff for your support 
and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Aaron Smith, Job Challenges Loom for War Vets, CNN MONEY (Mar. 22, 
2012, 1:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/22/news/economy/unemployment-
veterans/index.htm.  
 2. Jeffrey Schieberl & Charles P. Leo, The Employers’ Legal Obligations to 
Employees in the Military, GRAZIADO BUS. REV. (2007), http://gbr.pepperdine. 
edu/2010/08/the-employers-legal-obligations-to-employees-in-the-military/#_edn3. 
 3. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Veterans Return from War to Find Jobs Gone, 
TODAY MONEY (June 20, 2012, 7:03 AM), http://lifeinc.today.com/_news/2012/ 
06/20/12241515-veterans-return-from-war-to-find-jobs-gone?lite. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See Smith, supra note 1. 
 6. See Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 
4301-4333 (2006 & Supp. 2011)). 
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member would have been in had he or she never left for service.7  The em-
ployee’s employment position – determined upon return by the “escalator 
principle” – may move up, down, or stay the same while the employee is on 
military leave.8  A recent Eighth Circuit decision, Milhauser v. Minco Prod-
ucts, Inc., clarified that in certain circumstances, even termination qualifies as 
a reemployment position.9   
In Milhauser, a maintenance technician took military leave from his 
employer to train for his anticipated deployment to Iraq.10  Subsequently, the 
employer suffered significant financial difficulties, and the company ordered  
a reduction in force.11  Based on the service member’s mediocre employ- 
ment record, he was one of four persons terminated from his department.12  
The Eighth Circuit held that the service member employee was not entitled  
to return to the company following his required military training               
because, according to the escalator principle, his position of reemployment 
was termination.13   
This Note assesses Milhauser’s impact on reemployment claims under 
USERRA.  Part II begins with an analysis of the facts and holding of the case.  
Next, Part III synthesizes the background of USERRA, provides an overview 
of the statute, and introduces the escalator principle.  Part IV outlines the 
court’s rationale in deciding Milhauser.  Finally, Part V discusses the impact 
of Milhauser on USERRA reemployment claims.  This Note argues that: (1) 
the court’s reliance on USERRA regulation § 1002.194 was misplaced be-
cause the court’s interpretation presents a conflict between two sections of the 
statute and creates burden of proof issues; (2) the Milhauser holding should 
be narrowly interpreted; and (3) the case presents several unanswered ques-
tions that will spur subsequent litigation. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Douglas Milhauser brought the present action against his former em-
ployer, Minco Products, Inc. (Minco), claiming the company violated his 
rights under USERRA.14  Milhauser worked as a maintenance technician for 
Minco from 2006 to 2009.15  Throughout his employment with Minco, Mi-
lhauser also served as a member of the Navy Reserves and the Air Force Re-
  
 7. See §§ 4312-4313. 
 8. See Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 F.3d 268, 271 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 9. See id. at 269-70. 
 10. Id. at 270. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 272. 
 14. Id. at 270. 
 15. Id. 
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serves.16  Milhauser’s membership in the armed services required him to take 
three separate military leaves of absence from Minco between 2007 and 
2009.17  The circumstances giving rise to litigation surrounded Milhauser’s 
third leave of absence.18 
Prior to his third military leave of absence, Milhauser’s performance as 
a maintenance technician was “inconsistent and sometimes poor.”19  Several 
of Milhauser’s colleagues expressed concerns about his attitude and the quali-
ty of his work.20  On one occasion, Milhauser received a written reprimand 
from his supervisors.21  Following the reprimand, Milhauser’s supervisors 
reassigned several of his duties to other maintenance technicians, replacing 
them with more menial tasks.22  
In 2008, Minco experienced a decline in customer orders; at the end     
of the year, the company posted its first ever annual loss.23  Because the num-
ber of orders continued to decrease into 2009, Minco sought to cut costs      
by delaying the purchase of new equipment, reducing overtime hours for 
employees, and cutting employee pay.24  Additionally, in March 2009,    
Minco reduced its workforce by cutting eighteen jobs.25  Milhauser, who  
began his third military leave of absence that month, was not one of the    
employees terminated.26   
Despite eliminating eighteen jobs, Minco found the savings insufficient 
to compensate for company losses, and the company decided to cut an addi-
tional thirty-two jobs in June 2009.27  In anticipation of the June cuts, Minco 
requested that Milhauser’s supervisor name four of the thirteen employees 
whom he supervised to be considered for termination.28  After considering 
work duties, special expertise, and attitudes of his employees, the supervisor 
nominated Milhauser as one of the four employees to be terminated.29  He 
believed that Milhauser had no unique area of specialization and that, there-
fore, Milhauser’s job functions could be more easily absorbed by other em-
  
 16. See Appellant’s Brief, Milhauser, 701 F.3d 268 (No. 12-1756), 2012 WL 
6653255, at *5-6; Appellee’s Brief, Milhauser, 701 F.3d 268 (No. 12-1756), 2012 
WL 2524496, at *6-7. 
 17. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 270. 
 18. See id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 16, at *7. 
 23. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 270. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
3
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ployees at the company.30  When Milhauser’s deployment ended prematurely 
in June, he reported back to work and was immediately terminated.31 
Milhauser subsequently brought a claim against Minco in the District 
Court for the District of Minnesota, claiming the company failed to provide 
reemployment as required by USERRA under 38 U.S.C. § 4312.32  The 
USERRA statute requires that service members be reemployed “in the posi-
tion of employment in which the person would have been employed if the 
continuous employment of such person with the employer had not been inter-
rupted by such service . . . .”33  This idea is termed the “escalator principle.”34   
In response to the claim, Minco argued that changed circumstances 
made Milhauser’s reemployment “impossible or unreasonable,” which is an 
affirmative defense under the USERRA statute. 35  In the alternative, Minco 
asserted that it placed Milhauser in the proper reemployment position – ter-
mination – because Milhauser would have been terminated even if he had not 
left for service.36  Following trial, but before the case was submitted to the 
jury, Milhauser moved for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that Minco’s 
evidence of economic difficulties was insufficient to prove his reemployment 
  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  Milhauer’s deployment ended prematurely after he suffered a severe 
reaction to a vaccine.  Id.  His third military leave lasted less than ninety days.  Appel-
lee’s Brief, supra note 16, at *7. 
 32. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 270.  Milhauser also brought a claim for discrimina-
tion on the basis of military service under 38 U.S.C. § 4311; however, the jury found 
Milhauser’s military status was not a factor in his termination, and the finding was not 
contested on appeal.  Id. at 270-71.  38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2006) provides: 
Subject to subsections (b), (c), and (d) and to section 4304, any person whose 
absence from a position of employment is necessitated by reason of service in 
the uniformed services shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and bene-
fits and other employment benefits of this chapter if – 
(1) the person (or an appropriate officer of the uniformed service in which 
such service is performed) has given advance written or verbal notice of such 
service to such person’s employer; 
(2) the cumulative length of the absence and of all previous absences from a 
position of employment with that employer by reason of service in the uni-
formed services does not exceed five years; and 
(3) except as provided in subsection (f), the person reports to, or submits an 
application for reemployment to, such employer in accordance with the provi-
sions of subsection (e). 
 33. § 4313(a) (“[A] person entitled to reemployment under section 4312 . . .  
shall be promptly reemployed . . . in the position of employment in which the person 
would have been employed if the continuous employment of such person with the 
employer had not been interrupted by such service, the duties of which the person is 
qualified to perform.”). 
 34. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 271. 
 35. See § 4312(d)(1). 
 36. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 270-71. 
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was “impossible or unreasonable.”37  Milhauser argued that without sufficient 
proof of the affirmative defense, he was “absolutely entitled to reemploy-
ment.”38  The district court disagreed and denied Milhauser’s motion.39 
The court then submitted the case to the jury.40  The jury instructions 
contained an explanation of the “escalator principle”41 and indicated that it 
was Milhauser’s burden to show that Minco failed to reemploy him in the 
appropriate escalator position.42  During jury deliberations, the jurors      
asked the judge whether layoff or termination could be a valid reemployment 
position under the escalator principle.43  Milhauser argued that termination 
was not a valid reemployment position; rather, termination of a returning 
service member was permissible only where the defendant proved reemploy-
ment was “impossible or unreasonable.”44  Minco, on the other hand, argued 
Milhauser’s termination was a valid reemployment position because his posi-
tion would have been eliminated as a part of the company’s reduction in 
force, “regardless of his military service.”45  The court directed the jury to its 
earlier instruction.46  The jury returned a verdict for Minco, finding that Min-
co failed to prove its “impossible or unreasonable” affirmative defense, but 
also finding that Milhauser failed to prove Minco reemployed him in an   
inappropriate position.47  
Following the verdict, Milhauser renewed his motion for judgment as    
a matter of law.48  He argued that: (1) termination is not a valid reemploy-
ment position, and (2) if termination is a valid reemployment position, termi-
nation is permissible only where it occurred automatically and without     
  
 37. Id. at 271. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  The jury instruction stated: 
USERRA requires reemployment in the position that [Milhauser] would, with 
reasonable certainty, have been in had his employment not been interrupted by 
military service.  This is called the escalator position.  The principle is that the 
employee should be in the same position he would have been in had he not 
taken military leave, no better and no worse.  Depending on what happened 
during the employee’s absence, the escalator position might be a promotion, 
demotion, transfer, layoff or termination. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 42. Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (D. Minn. 2012).  
The jury instruction stated, “It is Mr. Milhauser’s burden to show that Minco failed to 
reemploy him in the escalator position or in a position which was the nearest approx-
imation of the escalator position.”  Id. 
 43. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 271. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 271-72. 
 48. Id. at 272. 
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employer discretion.49  The trial court denied the motion and entered      
judgment on the jury’s verdict.50  Milhauser appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
judgment as a matter of law.51  The Eighth Circuit held that termination is a 
valid reemployment position under USERRA’s escalator principle where    
the employer’s systematic reduction in force caused the service member’s 
position to be eliminated and where the service member’s position would 
have been eliminated whether or not his or her employment was interrupted 
by military service.52 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part provides an introduction to reemployment rights law under 
USERRA by reviewing the predecessors and passage of USERRA, briefly 
examining relevant provisions of the statute, and introducing the escalator 
principle used in reemployment claims. 
A. Background of USERRA 
The concept of reemployment rights for returning service members is 
not a recent development.53  As early as 1940, legislators passed federal laws 
protecting veterans’ employment and reemployment rights following a period 
of service in the armed forces.54  Today, these rights are codified in Chapter 
43 of Title 38 of the United States Code.55  Much of the current law involving 
reemployment privileges for returning service members derives from the 
original federal statute granting these rights.56   
The pressure to create a federal statute to benefit returning ser-          
vice members peaked after World War I, when millions of United States 
troops were demobilized.57  Upon their return to civilian life, many of these 
veterans were unable to find employment.58  In 1932, Walter Waters and  
other unemployed veterans traveled to Washington, D.C. to persuade      
  
 49. See id.  In particular, Milhauser referenced automatic terminations occurring 
through a seniority system.  Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 272-73. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (2013). 
 54. S. REP. NO. 104-371 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3762, at 3777, 
1996 WL 560715, at *26. 
 55. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 56. See Andrew P. Sparks, Note, From the Desert to the Courtroom: The Uni-
formed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 773, 
777 (2010). 
 57. See id. at 776. 
 58. See id. 
6
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Congress to issue veterans’ bonus checks that were not due for another dec-
ade.59  In addition to camping in parks and leading parades, these “Bonus 
Marchers” led a march of 5,000 to 8,000 veterans down Pennsylvania Avenue 
in front of 10,000 spectators.60   Although Congress ultimately rejected the 
Bonus Marchers’ proposal, Congress sought to avoid future protests involv-
ing masses of unemployed veterans.61  In 1940, Congress passed the Selective 
Training and Service Act, which granted federal employment and reemploy-
ment rights to veterans.62 
The Selective Training and Service Act stated that any person who left a 
position of employment for training or service in the armed forces was enti-
tled to restoration in “such position or to a position of like seniority, status, 
and pay.”63  This right was conditioned upon both the employee remaining 
qualified to perform the duties of his position and the employer’s circum-
stances being such that reemployment was not impossible or unreasonable.64  
Additionally, the act prohibited the United States government and private 
employers from discharging a returning service member from such position 
“without cause within one year after such restoration.”65 
Following passage of the Selective Training and Service Act, Congress 
enacted several other pieces of legislation to protect the employment and 
reemployment rights of members of the armed services, including the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act of 1967 and the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjust-
ment Assistance Act of 1974.66  These acts essentially served as “new permu-
tations” of the Selective Training and Service Act, retaining much of its con-
tent and structure.67  For example, under the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights 
Act (VRRA),68 which governed military employment and reemployment 
rights from 1974 to 1994, a service member who left a position of employ-
ment to complete military service was entitled restoration “to such position or 
to a position of like seniority, status, and pay,” so long as the service member 
was still “qualified to perform the duties of such position.”69  VRRA further 
mandated that the employer “give such person such status in his employment 
  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 8, 54 Stat. 
885, 890-92 (1940) (repealed 1948); see also David Ogles, Comment, Life During 
(and After) Wartime: Enforceability of Waivers Under USERRA, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
387, 389 (2012). 
 63. § 8(b), 54 Stat. at 890. 
 64. Id. 
 65. § 8(c), 54 Stat. at 890. 
 66. Sparks, supra note 56, at 777. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93–508, § 404, 88 Stat. 1578, 1594 (1974); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (2013). 
 69. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). 
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as he would have enjoyed . . . in such employment continuously from the 
time of such person’s entering the armed forces until the time of such per-
son’s restoration to such employment, or reemployment.”70  
Although Congress believed VRRA effectively served the interests of 
armed services personnel and employers, by 1988 the statute presented two 
significant problems.71  First, Congress found the statute “complex and some-
times ambiguous” as to the parties’ rights and responsibilities, inviting confu-
sion and misinterpretation.72  For example, employers were uncertain which 
of the various services and types of training triggered reemployment rights.73  
A second problem with VRRA was that implementation of the military’s 
“Total Force” policy, which increased reserve members’ responsibility for 
every phase of military preparedness, antiquated certain provisions of the 
act.74  For example, the policy requires extended periods of training – a factor 
not addressed by VRRA.75  Because of the foregoing complications, in 1988, 
representatives from the Departments of Labor, Defense, Justice, and the 
Office of Personnel Management formed an executive branch task force to 
promulgate suggested revisions to chapter 43.76   
The task force sought “to clarify, simplify, and . . . strengthen the exist-
ing veterans’ employment and reemployment rights provisions.”77  Sugges-
tions promulgated by the task force eventually formed the basis for 
USERRA,78 which became law on October 13, 1994.79  Congress stressed 
that the body of case law that developed under VRRA remained in full force 
  
 70. § 2021(b)(2). 
 71. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, at 
2451, 1993 WL 235763, at *18. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, 1993 WL 235763, at *19. 
 74. S. REP. NO. 103-158 (1993), 1993 WL 432576, at *39.  Under the “Total 
Force” policy, the Department of Defense shrunk the size of the active forces and 
increased the size of the cheaper-to-maintain reserve forces.  Role of the Reserves in 
the Total Force Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness, & the H. Comm. 
on Armed Servs., 101st Cong. 1 (1989) (statement of Richard A. Davis, Dir., Army 
Issues Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Affairs Div.), available at http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/110/102373.pdf.  Because reservists are now the primary source of personnel to 
supplement active forces during military emergencies, the policy calls for reserve 
forces to “be equal partners to their active counterparts in peacetime as well as war-
time and must be as ready as their active counterparts.”  Id. at 2. 
 75. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, 1993 WL 235763, at *19. 
 76. S. REP. NO. 103-158, 1993 WL 432576, at *39.   
 77. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, 1993 WL 235763, at *18. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 1994) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-
4333 (2006 & Supp. 2011)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.3 (2013). 
8
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and effect to the extent that it was consistent with USERRA provisions.80  
The purposes of the revised act were:  
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by elimi-
nating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and em-
ployment which can result from such service; 
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing ser-
vice in the uniformed services as well as to their employers, their fel-
low employees, and their communities, by providing for the prompt 
reemployment of such persons upon their completion of such service; 
and 
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their service 
in the uniformed services.81 
USERRA’s specific employment protections for returning service members 
are outlined in more detail below.82  The revised statute retains the rights 
guaranteed by its predecessors while also providing the clarity and currency 
that Congress sought.83 
B. Overview of USERRA Provisions 
This section provides an overview of the coverage and force of 
USERRA, and it introduces the two general safeguards provided to qual-  
ified service members under the statute – the right to reemployment and pro-
tection from adverse employment action.84  Broadly, USERRA protects 
members of the uniformed services who return to their previous place of em-
ployment following leave for service obligations.85  USERRA’s general pro-
vision provides: 
A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, 
has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform 
service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, 
reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of 
  
 80. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2. 
 81. 38 U.S.C. § 4301. 
 82. See infra Part III.B. 
 83. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.2. 
 84. See §§ 4311-4312. 
 85. See §§ 4301-4333; see also Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 930 
(8th Cir. 2007).  The Act does not, however, protect certain persons who served in the 
uniformed services but whose entitlements to benefits were terminated upon the oc-
currence of certain events, such as dishonorable or bad conduct discharge.  38 U.S.C. 
§ 4304. 
9
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employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, applica-
tion for membership, performance of service, application for service, 
or obligation.86 
The term “uniformed services” includes the Armed Forces, Army Na-
tional Guard, Air National Guard, and other categories designated by the 
President during times of war or national emergencies.87  The phrase “service 
in the uniformed service” refers to voluntary or involuntary performance of a 
duty in the uniformed services that was performed under competent authority, 
including, “active duty, active duty for training, initial active duty for train-
ing, inactive duty training, full-time National Guard duty,” fitness exams for 
duty, and funeral honors duties.88 
USERRA supersedes all state laws, contracts, policies, or other    
agreements that reduce or eliminate the rights and benefits enumerated         
in chapter 43.89  To further clarify USERRA, Congress authorized the Secre-
tary of Labor to prescribe regulations implementing the act’s provisions.90  
Because Congress enacted USERRA to protect members of the uniformed 
services, courts construe the act’s provisions broadly, in favor of mil-        
itary beneficiaries.91     
USERRA sections 4311(b) and 4312 interact to protect returning       
service members in two distinct ways.92  First, section 4312 grants an affirma-
tive right to reemployment for employees who serve in the uniformed ser-
vices.93  The section states that “any person whose absence from a position of 
employment is necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed services 
shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits and other            
employment benefits of this chapter . . . .”94  To bring a USERRA claim un-
der section 4312, the employee need only show: “[1] proper notice to his 
employer [prior to] departure, [2] a service period of less than five years, [3] a 
timely request for reemployment [along with] proper documentation, and [4] 
separation from military service under ‘honorable conditions.’”95  
  
 86. § 4311(a). 
 87. § 4303(16). 
 88. § 4303(13). 
 89. § 4302(b). 
 90. § 4331(a). 
 91. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 551-52 (8th Cir. 
2005); Hill v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2001); McGuire 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 152 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 92. See Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 93. See § 4312(a).  The provision also contains certain notification and time 
requirements.  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Petty v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 687 F.3d 710, 716-17 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
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Reemployment claims are “without question as to the employer’s intent,”96 
and an employee does not need to prove his employer discriminated against 
him in order to be eligible for reemployment.97   
Section 4312(d) explains limited situations in which an employer is not 
required to reemploy a returning service member.98  Such exceptions to 
reemployment, or affirmative defenses, include:  
(A) the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make such 
reemployment impossible or unreasonable; 
(B) in the case of a person entitled to reemployment under subsection 
(a)(3), (a)(4), or (b)(2)(B) of section 4313, such employment would 
impose an undue hardship on the employer; or 
(C) the employment from which the person leaves to serve in the uni-
formed services is for a brief, nonrecurrent period and there is no rea-
sonable expectation that such employment will continue indefinitely 
or for a significant period.99 
The employer carries the burden to prove the above affirmative defenses by a 
preponderance of the evidence.100  These affirmative defenses “must be con-
strued narrowly against an employer who seeks to avoid reemployment” due 
to USERRA’s broad construction in favor of returning service members.101 
The second protective provision, section 4311(b), protects returning ser-
vice members by making it illegal for employers to discriminate or take ad-
verse employment action against persons who served in the armed forces 
upon their return.102  Discrimination claims under USERRA require the plain-
tiff to show that military service was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s 
decision to take adverse action against him or her.103  One court summarized 
the interaction between sections 4311 and 4312 by explaining, “[i]n short, § 
4312 requires an employer to rehire covered employees; § 4311 then operates 
to prevent employers from treating those employees differently after they are 
rehired . . . .” 104  In other words, section 4312 entitles a person to immediate 
reemployment but does not prevent the employer from terminating the person 
  
 96. Jordan v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1208 (C.D.    
Cal. 2002). 
 97. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.33 (2013). 
 98. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1). 
 99. Id. 
 100. § 4312(d)(2). 
 101. KATHRYN PISCITELLI & EDWARD STILL, THE USERRA MANUAL § 4:2 (2013). 
 102. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b). 
 103. See § 4311(c). 
 104. Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2006); 
see also Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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the next day; however, the employee is not without protection because section 
4311 then acts to protect the employee as soon as he or she is reemployed.105  
C. The Escalator Principle 
USERRA not only provides members of the uniformed services with 
rights to reemployment upon returning from service, but the act also man-
dates certain employment positions upon return.106  Section 4313 includes a 
detailed outline of rules commanding the employment position to which a 
person is entitled.107  The rules are categorized by duration of one’s period of 
service, disability, and qualification for the position.108  For a person whose 
period of service was less than 91 days, for example, section 4313 states that 
he shall be “promptly” reemployed: 
(A) in the position of employment in which the person would have 
been employed if the continuous employment of such person with the 
employer had not been interrupted by such service, the duties of which 
the person is qualified to perform; or 
(B) in the position of employment in which the person was employed 
on the date of the commencement of the service in the uniformed ser-
vices, only if the person is not qualified to perform the duties of the 
position referred to in subparagraph (A) after reasonable efforts by the 
employer to qualify the person.109  
Courts termed the requirement that an employer treat an employee as if 
he or she remained continuously employed the “escalator principle.”110  One 
author commented that the escalator principle is the “touchstone of USERRA 
reemployment law.”111  The escalator principle was first discussed in the 
1946 Supreme Court decision Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair 
Corp.112  Explaining that a veteran should not be penalized because of his 
absence from his civilian job, the Court stated: 
  
 105. See Hart v. Family Dental Grp., 645 F.3d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 106. See § 4313(a). 
 107. See § 4313. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See § 4313(a)(1). 
 110. See, e.g., Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 F.3d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 2012); 
see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.191 (2013).  See generally Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers 
Fighting Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
797, 817-18 (2004) (analyzing courts’ usage of USERRA’s escalator principle). 
 111. Wedlund, supra note 110, at 809. 
 112. 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946). 
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He must be restored to his former position “or to a position of like  
seniority, status, and pay.” . . . He shall be “restored without loss       
of seniority” and be considered “as having been on furlough or leave 
of absence” during the period of his service for his country, with all  
of the insurance and other benefits accruing to employees on furlough 
or leave of absence.  Thus he does not step back on the seniority      
escalator at the point he stepped off.  He steps back on at the precise 
point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously 
during the war.113 
The escalator metaphor imagines the employee on a particular step of an 
escalator (his employment position upon leave), which may move up or down 
during military leave.114  When the employee returns from leave, he is placed 
back onto this same “step,” which may have moved up or down while he was 
gone.115  Courts since Fishgold continue to use this escalator metaphor. 
For example, the Supreme Court held in Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Co. that employees who went on military leave were entitled to seniority 
benefits mirroring those they would have attained had they never left for mili-
tary service.116  In Tilton, a railroad company employer, pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, internally upgraded three employees from carmen 
helpers to carmen mechanics.117  These employees were each working toward 
certain mechanic seniority benefits when they were called to military service; 
such seniority benefits vested only upon completion of 1,040 days of work as 
a mechanic.118  While these three men were on military leave, the employer 
promoted several additional carmen helpers to carmen mechanics.119  Each of 
these later-promoted men completed their full 1,040 days of work to attain 
seniority mechanic status prior to the three original employees.120  The Su-
preme Court held that under the escalator principle the returning service 
member employees, each upon return and completion of their full 1,040 work 
days as a mechanic, were entitled to seniority mechanic status superior to the 
employees who were promoted after them because, had these individuals not 
taken military leave, their seniority would have vested first.121  
In Serricchio v. Wachovia Securities, the Second Circuit found a viola-
tion of USERRA section 4313 under the escalator principle.122  In Serricchio, 
  
 113. Id. (citations omitted). 
 114. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 271 n.2. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 376 U.S. 169, 181 (1964). 
 117. Id. at 172-73. 
 118. Id. at 173. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 181-82. 
 122. 658 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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an employee returned to his job at a bank following military leave.123  The 
bank reemployed the service member and compensated him at the same 
commission rate he earned prior to his leave; however, the bank refused to re-
assign the employee his former book of clients, which contained over 130 
clients and managed over nine million dollars in assets, instead assigning him 
to several smaller accounts with less funding.124  The Second Circuit agreed 
with the district court that the employee’s reemployment position did not 
offer “the same opportunities for advancement, working conditions and re-
sponsibility” under the escalator principle.125 
The Secretary of Labor’s 2005 USERRA regulations also explicitly rec-
ognize the escalator principle.126  Section 1002.191 in Chapter 20 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) states:  
As a general rule, the employee is entitled to reemployment in the job 
position that he or she would have attained with reasonable certainty if 
not for the absence due to uniformed service.  This position is known 
as the escalator position . . . .  The escalator principle requires that the 
employee be reemployed in a position that reflects with reasonable 
certainty the pay, benefits, seniority, and other job perquisites, that he 
or she would have attained if not for the period of service.127  
It is important to note that the escalator position may move up              
or down.128  USERRA regulation 1002.194 provides, “[t]he Act does not 
prohibit lawful adverse job consequences that result from the employee’s 
restoration on the seniority ladder.  Depending on the circumstances, the  
escalator principle may cause an employee to be reemployed in a higher or 
lower position, laid off, or even terminated.”129  For example, the regulation 
notes that if an employee’s job classification was laid off during leave and 
such layoff continued after the employee’s reemployment, the employer 
should reinstate the employee in layoff status.130  Depending on the escalator 
principle, a reemployment position may implicate “transfer to another shift or 
location, more or less strenuous working conditions, or changed opportunities 
for advancement.”131 
Several cases demonstrate adverse job consequences under the escalator 
principle.  For example, in Woodward v. New York Health & Hospitals Corp., 
the Eastern District of New York held that an employer’s reinstatement of a 
  
 123. Id. at 176-77. 
 124. Id. at 177, 183. 
 125. See id. at 183.  
 126. Id. at 272.  
 127. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.191 (2013). 
 128. § 1002.194.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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service member into a different employment division was permissible.132  The 
court reasoned that the reemployment position was of similar pay and seniori-
ty and remained a managerial-level position that used the employee’s “skills 
and qualifications.”133  The opinion further justified any change in the em-
ployee’s work tasks as due to the employer’s staffing needs and tight budg-
et.134  Similarly, the Western District of Missouri granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of an employer where a returning service member’s truck route 
was eliminated during his leave.135  Upon the service member’s return, the 
employer assigned the employee to a different route based on a collective 
bargaining agreement.136  The court agreed with the employer’s argument that 
the employer complied with the escalator principle and USERAA require-
ments by “offering [the employee] job(s) at locations where he undisputedly 
would have been entitled to work had he been continuously employed.”137  
In sum, Congress developed a special niche in federal law to protect uni-
formed service members who return to civilian employment.  Safeguards 
under USERRA include an affirmative right to reemployment, protection 
from adverse employment action, and a certain position of employment upon 
return from service.  It was within this framework that the Eighth Circuit took 
up Milhauser v. Minco.   
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Using a de novo standard of review, the Eighth Circuit held that termi-
nation is a valid reemployment position under USERRA’s escalator principle, 
and therefore, Milhauser was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.138 
The court began its analysis with a brief introduction to the “escalator 
principle.”139  It referenced the principle’s source, 28 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(1)(A), 
which requires employers to reemploy returning service members “in the 
position of employment in which the person would have been employed if  
the continuous employment of such person with the employer had not been 
interrupted by such service.”140  Citing the Supreme Court decision of Fish-
gold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., the court clarified that a returning 
service member is “not necessarily [entitled] to the same position he or she 
held on departure.”141  Instead, the majority noted, the escalator principle 
  
 132. 554 F. Supp. 2d 329, 355-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 133. Id. at 357. 
 134. Id. at 356-57. 
 135. Hogan v. United Parcel Serv., 648 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (W.D. Mo. 2009). 
 136. Id. at 1134-35. 
 137. Id. at 1144. 
 138. Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 F.3d 268, 272-73 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 139. Id. at 272. 
 140. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(1)(A) (2006)). 
 141. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 272 (citing Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair 
Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946)). 
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entitles the employee to congruent “pay, benefits, seniority, and other job 
perquisites” of the position the service member would have attained had he 
not left for service.142 
The Eighth Circuit next addressed Milhauser’s contention that termina-
tion cannot be a “position of employment” under USERRA.143  The court 
cited three separate sources of law contravening Milhauser’s argument.144  
First, the court noted that the statute from which the escalator principle is 
derived requires an employer to look at an employee’s career trajectory as if 
it “had not been interrupted by” military service.145  Second, it cited the De-
partment of Labor’s USERRA regulation section 1002.194 that states, “De-
pending on the circumstances, the escalator principle may cause an employee 
to be reemployed in a higher or lower position, laid off, or even terminat-
ed.”146  Finally, the majority acknowledged that other courts have recognized 
termination as a valid position of employment, citing Derepkowski v. Smith-
Lee Co.147  Therefore, the court concluded, the idea of termination as a “posi-
tion of employment” is consistent with USERRA.148 
The court lastly commented on Milhauser’s alternative argument that, if 
termination is a “position of employment” under USERRA, it is only permis-
sible if the employee would have been terminated automatically.149  The court 
noted that Milhauser argued this ground for judgment as a matter of law only 
  
 142. Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1002.191 (2013)). 
 143. Id. at 272-73. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 272 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(1)(A) (2006)). 
 146. Id. at 272-73 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 1002.194) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id. at 273.  The court cited only one thirty-year-old case from the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin to support its assertion that “other courts” hold termination is a 
valid reemployment position.  Id.; see Derepkowski v. Smith-Lee Co., 371 F. Supp. 
1071 (E.D. Wis. 1974).  In that case, the employer transferred its operations from 
Wisconsin to New York, paying seniority-based severance benefits to employees 
terminated at the time of transfer.  Derepkowski, 371 F. Supp. at 1071.  When the 
plaintiff-employee returned from military leave, the employer offered him a position 
in New York but did not offer him seniority-based severance pay, which was offered 
to all other employees.  Id.  The employer argued it did not have to pay severance 
benefits because the statute [VRRA] required the employer to restore the service 
member to a “position” before any other benefits had to be paid; in this case, the em-
ployer argued, no restoration to reemployment was possible due to changed circum-
stances.  Id. at 1072.  The court said that under the statute the employer must “restore 
the plaintiff to the ‘status’ he would have enjoyed had he been present in the defend-
ant’s employ rather than in military service – the ‘status’ being that of a terminated 
employee eligible for severance pay.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the court 
held the offer of a position in New York without an offer of severance benefits consti-
tuted an offer inferior to other employees and was impermissible.  Id. 
 148. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 272-73. 
 149. Id. at 273. 
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post-verdict, not pre-verdict.150  Citing Rockport Pharmacy, Inc. v. Digital 
Simplistics, Inc., the majority stated that “a party may not advance postverdict 
grounds for judgment as a matter of law when it should have raised the issues 
earlier in the trial.”151  The court found Milhauser did not adequately preserve 
the issue, and therefore, it could not reach the merits of Milhauser’s second 
argument on appeal.152 
Because the Eighth Circuit found sufficient support for the assertion that 
termination is a valid employment position under the escalator principle, the 
court upheld the district court’s denial of Milhauser’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law.153 
V.  COMMENT 
While Milhauser v. Minco appears an obvious application of established 
law to fact, the case presents several concerns that will likely impact future 
veteran reemployment claims.  The Eighth Circuit essentially opened the door 
to litigation involving termination as a reemployment position under 
USERRA sections 4312 and 4313.154  This Part argues that: (1) the court’s 
holding exacerbates a burden of proof conflict between section 4312(d) af-
firmative defenses and section 4313 reemployment positions under the esca-
lator principle; (2) courts should narrowly interpret Milhauser’s holding; and 
(3) courts and employers need additional guidance on when employers can 
validly terminate service members because of “reduction in force” cuts. 
  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 273 (citing Rockport Pharmacy, Inc. v. Digital Simplistics, Inc., 53 
F.3d 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 272-73.  Judge Shepherd concurred in the opinion, arguing the court 
did not need to reach the issue of whether termination was a valid employment posi-
tion.  Id. at 273-74 (Shepherd, J., concurring).  In his opinion, the issue presented 
involved the adequacy of the jury instruction.  See id.  Because Milhauser did not 
object to the jury instruction, nor raise the issue of the jury instruction on appeal, 
Judge Shepherd argued the court could not consider the issue of termination as a valid 
reemployment position on appeal.  See id. 
 154. While regulation 1002.194 states that under certain circumstances, “the esca-
lator principle may cause an employee to be reemployed in a higher or lower position, 
laid off, or even terminated,” few court decisions provide guidance in determining to 
what “circumstances” the regulation refers.  20 C.F.R. § 1002.194 (2013).  The court 
in Milhauser claims other courts have upheld termination as a position of reemploy-
ment; however, the majority cites only a district court case from Wisconsin, which 
held the employee’s position of reemployment was termination with severance pay 
after his entire factory had been shut down and all employees – including the plaintiff 
– were given the option of transfer or termination with severance pay.  See Milhauser, 
701 F.3d at 273 (referencing Derepkowski v. Smith-Lee Co., 371 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. 
Wis. 1974)); see also discussion infra Part V.C. 
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A.  Exacerbated Conflict Between Section 4312(d) and Section 4313 
The Milhauser court’s reliance on one misplaced regulation renders 
4312(d)’s affirmative defenses meaningless and confuses the burden of proof 
for future USERRA reemployment claims.155  By reviewing the statutory 
language and legislative history of USERRA, this Part argues that the “esca-
lator position” under section 4313 can move up or down; however, it cannot 
go “all the way” down.  Rather, to justify termination as a valid reemploy-
ment position, the employer must still prove one of the affirmative defenses 
under section 4312(d) by a preponderance of the evidence. 
As previously discussed, returning service members are required to sat-
isfy four simple elements to avail themselves of USERRA’s unqualified right 
to reemployment.156  Once these elements are satisfied, the employer must 
prove that employment was “impossible or unreasonable” based on changed 
circumstances157 to warrant a failure to reemploy the service member.158  
Under the court’s decision in Milhauser, however, the employer can justify 
failing to reemploy a service member by merely arguing termination was his 
or her reemployment position.159  By placing the burden on the plaintiff to 
prove he or she was reemployed in the incorrect escalator position, the court 
essentially absolved the employer from having to prove its affirmative de-
fense by a preponderance of the evidence.160  If the above result were an ac-
curate reading of the statute, then section 4312(d) would be largely insignifi-
  
 155. Milhauser argued this point to the district court but it was rejected due to a 
technicality.  See Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901-02 (D. 
Minn. 2012) (“Even if Milhauser is correct, to the extent that he is arguing that Min-
co’s economic problems and reductions in force are only appropriately considered 
under the affirmative defense provision, he has waived this argument.”). 
 156. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 157. Or another one of the affirmative defenses listed in section 4312(d).  See 38 
U.S.C. § 4312(d) (2006). 
 158. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 160. After Milhauser, the employer can now assert termination was the service 
member’s escalator position of reemployment, and the burden is on the plaintiff to 
show the reemployment position is wrong.  See Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 
F.3d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir. 2012).  In this situation, the service member would then   
be responsible for proving the financial conditions, termination practices, position 
availability, etc. of the employer; this is a difficult burden on the plaintiff, who is      
in a worse position than the employer to have this information.  See Milhauser, 855 F. 
Supp. 2d at 902-03.  Milhauser argued this point in the lower court and the court con-
cluded, “the law clearly requires consideration of these factors somewhere, and Mi-
lhauser provided no assistance to the Court as to where consideration of those factors 
belonged.”  Id. at 904. 
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cant.161  The court in Milhauser came to its illogical conclusion relying main-
ly on USERRA regulation section 1002.194,162 which states that the escalator 
principle may result in a service member’s termination.163   
Fortunately, there is a more logical way to reconcile sections 4312(d) 
and 4313 – by assuming the escalator can move an employee’s position up or 
down but not “all the way” down to termination.164  Several details support 
that this is the correct interpretation of the statute.  First, the plain language of 
section 4313 – the basis for the escalator principle – states that the service 
member is entitled to a “position of employment”; hence, the statute is unam-
biguous that the position must be one of employment, not unemployment.165  
Second, to hold that section 4313 permits an employer to terminate an em-
ployee without the employer proving its burden under section 4312(d) would 
render the latter provision “superfluous, void, or insignificant,” contrary to an 
important canon of statutory construction.166  This note’s suggested under-
standing of the statute, however, gives both sections meaning – the escalator 
principle controls when there is a reemployment position and the affirmative 
defenses control when there is no reemployment position.   
  
 161. See, e.g., Milhauser, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 901-02 (referencing Mil-       
hauser’s claim that such an interpretation would make § 4212(d)’s affirmative     
defenses “superfluous”). 
 162. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 272-73.  The court also relied on Derepkowski v. 
Smith-Lee Co., 371 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Wis. 1974).  Id. at 273.  Derepkowski is 
clearly distinguishable because in that case: (1) it was beneficial for the claimant’s 
escalator position to be termination, (2) the main contention involved severance bene-
fits, not the escalator position, and (3) the employer clearly discriminated in the case 
by treating the service member different than other employees.  See supra note 147 
and accompanying text. 
 163. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.194 (2013). 
 164. Milhauser also proposed this solution to the district court.  See Milhauser, 
855 F. Supp. 2d at 892-95. 
 165. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820) (“The intention of the legislature is to be col-
lected from the words they employ. . . .  The case must be a strong one indeed, which 
would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . .”).  The dis-
trict court did not find this argument persuasive and instead relied on the Department 
of Labor’s regulations.  See Milhauser, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 893. 
 166. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted) (“It is ‘a 
cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to 
be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be su-
perfluous, void, or insignificant.’”); see also Milhauser, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 901-02 
(“Milhauser now argues that an interpretation that allows termination to be a possible 
reemployment position under section 4313 of USERRA renders the affirmative   
defense provision under section 4212(d) superfluous . . . .  Even if Milhauser is cor-
rect, . . . he has waived this argument.”). 
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Third, the stated purposes of the statute indicate that the legislature in-
tended to protect service members.167  The proposed reading of the statute, 
which requires an employer to prove a reemployment position was impossible 
or unreasonable before terminating the service member, acts to protect ser-
vice members; however, the court’s reading of the statute, which requires the 
returning service member to prove he was not reemployed in the appropriate 
position, actually harms service members because they are in a worse position 
than the employer to have information regarding the employer’s policies, 
finances, and available positions.168    
Finally, reviewing the legislative history, it does not appear the legisla-
ture intended termination to be a reemployment position.  For example, a 
report on USERRA from the House of Representatives notes that section 
4312(a) provides an “unqualified right” to reemployment and, other than fail-
ing to prove the requirements under 4312(a), “[t]he only other exceptions to 
the unqualified right to reemployment would be the provisions in subsection 
(d).”169  Additionally, while the House and Senate reports do refer to the esca-
lator positions of “layoff” (requiring placement on recall status) and “expira-
tion” (for temporary employees only), they do not mention termination as an 
employment position or state who is required to prove the appropriate em-
ployment position.170  Moreover, both the House and Senate reports refer to 
reduction in force cuts under section 4312(d)’s affirmative defenses rather 
than in their discussions of the escalator principle.171  Based on the foregoing 
  
 167. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 168. Requiring the returning service member to prove that a position was availa-
ble, when the employee has less knowledge of the business practices/structure than 
the corporation itself, is clearly contrary to the stated purpose to protect these service 
members.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, at 2457-
58, 1993 WL 235763, at *24-25. 
 170. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, 1993 WL 235763, at *30-31.  (“This could be the 
same position or a higher, lower, or lateral (e.g., a transfer) position or even possibly 
layoff or severance status . . . depending on what has happened to the employment 
situation in the servicemember’s absence.”); S. REP. NO. 103-158 (1993), 1993 WL 
432576, at *52-53 (“The Committee notes that, depending on the employment situa-
tion during the individual’s period of service in the uniformed services, the escalator 
can move up, down, or laterally.  In case of a layoff, the returning servicemember 
may be placed in a recall status.  As noted earlier, in the case of a temporary employ-
ee, the term of the position may have expired.”). 
 171. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, 1993 WL 235763, at *25 (“The very limited ex-
ception of unreasonable or impossible, which is in the nature of an affirmative de-
fense, and for which the employer has the burden of proof . . . is only applicable 
‘where reinstatement would require creation of a useless job or where there has been a 
reduction in the work force that reasonably would have included the veteran.’”); S. 
REP. NO. 103-158, 1993 WL 432576, at *49 (“New section 4312(d) would excuse an 
employer from having to reemploy a person if the employer’s circumstances had so 
changed as to make that reemployment impossible or unreasonable . . . .  The Com-
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observations, it is likely that the legislature intended the escalator to go up 
and down, but not all the way down; to go all the way down to termination 
(for example, based on a reduction in force), proof of an affirmative defense 
should be required.   
Thus, it appears that either the court in Milhauser misread USERRA 
regulation § 1002.194 or the regulation is simply inconsistent with the act.  
One possible way the court could have misinterpreted the regulation is by 
assuming the employer has no burden in cases where the escalator principle 
results in termination.  To the contrary, the regulation could convey that ter-
mination is an appropriate escalator position where the employer first proves 
termination is a valid “step” on the escalator by meeting the requirements of 
section 4312(d).  Alternatively, it is possible that the court misread the agen-
cy’s use of the term “termination” in the regulation;172 perhaps the regulation 
refers only to termination or “expiration” of a temporary employment posi-
tion, such as a seasonal job, as discussed in the legislative history.173   
Alternatively, one could argue that the Eighth Circuit correctly inter-
preted the agency’s regulation in section 1002.194 but that the Department of 
Labor misinterpreted the USERRA statute when it adopted the regulation.  
Under these circumstances, regulation 1002.194 may not survive Chevron 
deference174 because either the statute is unambiguous and needs no interpre-
tation or the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the statute is not reason-
able because it creates a statutory conflict.  Whether the court’s reliance on 
USERRA regulation 1002.194 was misplaced due to a misinterpretation or 
due to the regulation itself being incorrect, it is apparent that the Eighth Cir-
  
mittee does not intend to require the creation of a useless job or mandate reinstate-
ment where there has been a reduction in the work force that reasonably would have 
included the veteran.”).  This is echoed in the USERRA regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. § 
1002.139 (2013). 
 172. See § 1002.194 (“Depending on the circumstances, the escalator principle 
may cause an employee to be reemployed in a higher or lower position, laid off, or 
even terminated.”) (emphasis added). 
 173. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  In Chevron, the Court stated:  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it admin-
isters, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well 
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own con-
struction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43. 
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cuit failed to adequately review the regulation and the potential statutory con-
flict it creates. 
The Milhauser court’s unwavering reliance on USERRA regulation 
1002.194 was an error.  Reviewing the statutory language and legislative 
history, it appears that termination of a returning service member should only 
be permissible where the employer can prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, an affirmative defense under USERRA section 4312(d) that justifies a 
failure to reemploy.  By holding otherwise, the court encourages a conflict 
between USERRA sections 4312(d) and 4313 and blurs the line between the 
claimant’s and the employer’s burden of proof.  
B.  Narrow Interpretation 
Regardless of whether the decision was consistent with the USERRA 
statutes, Milhauser is precedent and demonstrates that uniformed service 
personnel are not absolutely protected from termination under USERRA.175  
Consequently, the decision gives employers more “flexibility in addressing 
workplace needs.”176  Employers must remember, however, that the facts of 
Milhauser are distinct and that the case provides only a limited exception to 
the general rule of reemployment and the general prohibition of termina-
tion.177  The court’s conclusion was contingent upon several specific facts 
that favored Minco’s position and persuaded the court that Milhauser was not 
disadvantaged because of his military service.178 
Three factors were especially pertinent.  First, Milhauser had a history 
of poor work performance, which was adequately documented with a paper 
trail.179  For example, not only did his coworkers complain about his work 
ethic, but Milhauser’s supervisors also gave him a warning and reassigned 
several of his job duties prior to his third military leave.180  Second, Minco 
presented evidence of the company’s poor economic circumstances surround-
  
 175. See Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 F.3d 268, 272 (8th Cir. 2012); see 
also Charlie Plumb, Limits on Reemployment Rights Under USERRA, MCAFEE & 
TAFT (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.mcafeetaft.com/Resources/Attorney-Arti-cles/Arti-
cles/Limits-on-reemployment-rightsunderUSERRA.aspx.  
 176. Sindy Warren, Can You Terminate an Employee Covered by USERRA?, 
WARREN & ASSOCIATES BLOG (Jan. 22, 2013), http://sindywarren.com/blog/page/4/. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See Brooke A. Colaizzi, Is Firing an Employee the Same as Reemploying 
Him?, LEXICOLOGY (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? 
g=c0cf4745-2f23-4b07-9f57-62a4249b37ad; George R. Wood, Eighth Circuit Rules 
That Termination of Employment Can Be a Proper Reinstatement Under the Uni-
formed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights, LEXICOLOGY (Dec. 11, 
2012),..http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d36ab010-fbdb-40b2-ae10967 
20e7e93bb. 
 179. See Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 270. 
 180. See id.; see also Colaizzi, supra note 178. 
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ing Milhauser’s termination,181 such that the jury found Milhauser’s employ-
ment position would have been terminated whether or not he left for military 
obligations.182  For example, the company presented evidence regarding: var-
ious ways it attempted to save money prior to laying off employees – by re-
ducing overtime hours, delaying the purchase of new equipment, and cutting 
pay; a systematic way of determining which employment positions needed to 
be cut; and objective criteria for why Milhauser was a candidate for termina-
tion.183  A third relevant and critical fact in the holding of Milhauser was that 
none of the other terminated employees were provided any benefits or oppor-
tunities that were not provided to Milhauser, such as an opportunity to bid or 
seek other employment opportunities within the company.184  Thus, Milhau-
ser was not at a disadvantage compared to other similarly situated employees 
who remained at Minco rather than taking leave for service.185   
In sum, Milhauser holds that in certain situations, termination can be a 
valid reemployment position under the escalator principle.186  The situations 
permitting termination, however, likely require significant circumstantial 
evidence, like the Milhauser case.  The less evidence an employer presents of 
past work-related deficiencies of the service member, poor economic circum-
stances for the employer, and consistent opportunities with other terminated 
employees, the less likely the court will find the employee’s legitimate esca-
lator position was termination.  Accordingly, Milhauser’s holding should be 
narrowly interpreted.   
C. Future “Reduction in Force” Terminations 
Milhauser is also informative in assessing the subject of future reduction 
in force terminations under USERRA.  For example, the court left open the 
question whether reductions in force must be automatic in order to constitute 
a valid reemployment position.  Other questions one might ask in future liti-
gation are: What constitutes an “automatic” reduction in force?  What hap-
pens when the company requires mandatory reduction in force cuts, but all 
employees are relatively evenly qualified?  When is a reduction in force justi-
fied such that termination is considered a valid option for returning service 
members?  Is the service member entitled to a right of first refusal when/if the 
position opens again?  These questions will likely be the subject of subse-
quent USERRA reemployment litigation. 
  
 181. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 271. 
 182. Id. at 272. 
 183. Id. at 270. 
 184. See Wood, supra note 178.  In this case, there were no opportunities present-
ed to any terminated employees. 
 185. For a better contrast, compare the fact patterns of Milhauser to those in 
Derepkowski v. Smith-Lee Co.  See supra notes 147, 162 and accompanying text. 
 186. Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 272-73. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
With 90,000 troops slated to return from Afghanistan by 2014, 
reemployment rights for returning service members are an increasing con-
cern.187  USERRA provides protection for returning service members by re-
quiring their civilian employers to reemploy them in the same position they 
would have been in had they never left.188  Milhauser makes clear that this 
reemployment position may be termination.189  Because Milhauser had strong 
circumstantial evidence regarding a valid reduction in force, however, its 
holding is likely narrow.  Courts in the future will have to reconcile the con-
flict endorsed by Milhauser between USERRA sections 4312(d) and 4313, 
and subsequent litigation will need to address unanswered questions regard-
ing when a service member can be validly terminated due to discretionary 
reductions in force. 
 
  
 187. See Smith, supra note 1. 
 188. See 38 U.S.C. § 4313 (2006). 
 189. See Milhauser, 701 F.3d at 272-73. 
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